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AGENDA III.C.1
The Regulation of Labor Unions
Theodore J. St. Antoine*
This year completes exactly a half century in the federalization
and codification of American labor law. Before that the regulation of
both the internal affairs and external relations of labor organizations
was left largely to the individual states, usually through the applica-
tion of common or nonstatutory law by the courts. One major ex.-
ception was the railroad industry, whose patent importance to
interstate commerce made it an acceptable subject for federal legis-
lation like the Railway Labor Act.1 In addition, the U.S. Supreme
Court read the "restraint of trade" prohibitions of the federal anti-
trust laws as encompassing certain union boycotts and other organi-
zational activities, thus exposing them to the risk of federal
remedies, including the dreaded injunction.2 Labor injunctions were
often issued "ex parte" without a hearing and were highly effective
in breaking strikes or work stoppages.
With these latter qualifications, however, state law
predominated prior to the 1930s. At the outset, in the early nine-
teenth century, efforts by working people to band together and with-
hold their services from employers in order to better their wages
and working conditions were commonly condemned as criminal con-
spiracies. 3 By midcentury the focus shifted from criminal to civil li-
ability.4 An ends-means test was enunciated: concerted employee
activity was a civil conspiracy if it had an illegal objective or em-
ployed illegal means. The intentional infliction of economic injury
was a prima facie tort and could only be justified by some legitimate
purpose. This gave the common law judges, most of whom hailed
from the propertied classes, considerable leeway to indulge their
own social philosophies in assessing the objectives of organized
workers. Meanwhile, the law initially paid little heed to the internal
arrangements of labor unions, treating them much like social clubs.
Nonetheless, by the 1930s the more venturesome state courts were
beginning to use contract, property, and even tort theories to afford
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1976).
2. Loewe v. Lawlor ["Danbury Hatters"], 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); see generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE,
THE LABOR INJuNcnoN (1930).
3. E.g., Commonwealth v. Pullis ["Philadelphia Cordwainers"] (Phil. Mayor's
Ct. 1806), in J. COMMONS, ED., 3 Doc. HIsT. AM. IND. Soc. 59 (2d ed. 1910).
4. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
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union members a measure of protection against arbitrary action on
the part of their organization. 5
Symptomatic of the unpredictable, sometimes inadvertent, de-
velopment of federal labor policy was the way the Norris-La Guardia
Act 6 ushered in the modern era of American labor law in 1932. Nor-
ris-La Guardia was not so much a piece of regulation as of
deregulation. Its primary aim was to get the federal judiciary out of
the business of enjoining strikes. The immediate effect was to re-
move federal controls as factors in the nation's labor disputes, apart
from the rail industry. This anachronistic invocation of laissez-faire
could hardly endure. Barely three years later, partly in response to
growing industrial unrest that had been exacerbated by the Great
Depression and partly in response to an increasing recognition of
workers' claims to broader social justice, Congress passed the Na-
tional Labor Relations (Wagner) Act,7 the first comprehensive fed-
eral regulation of the relations between American employers and
unions. Even so, it would be almost another twenty-five years
before Congress would essay a similar comprehensive regulation of
internal union affairs, the principal subject of this paper.
In 1957 a special committee of the U.S. Senate began a two-year
investigation and exposure of corrupt practices and abuses of demo-
cratic procedures in a relatively few (essentially five) American la-
bor organizations. A senatorial consensus soon emerged that a need
existed for federal legislation covering three specific areas, viz., re-
porting and disclosure of union procedures and finances, safeguards
for fair elections of union officers, and regulation of so-called "trust-
eeships," whereby national organizations suspend the autonomy of
constituent local bodies and take over their supervision. The ration-
ale for the emphasis on reporting and disclosure was the "goldfish
bowl" concept, the notion that if union members were kept ade-
quately informed about their organizations, they themselves could
remedy most abuses that might occur. Labor relations philosophies
in the United States are sufficiently divisive, however, and union-
management attitudes sufficiently hostile, that consensus has rarely
been the engine behind major new labor legislation, and 1958-59
proved no exception. Although a bill duly tailored to the three par-
ticular areas outlined above easily passed the Senate, it died in the
House of Representatives. Then the battle began in earnest.
A conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern Demo-
crats seized the occasion to press for wide-ranging provisions that
would enhance union "democracy" and at the same time might im-
pair the operational effectiveness of labor organizations. Archibald
5. E.g., Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931) (contract); Heasley v.
Operative Plasterers, 324 Pa. 257, 188 A. 206 (1936) (property). See generally Sum-
mers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE LJ. 175
(1960).
6. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1976).
7. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1976).
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Cox, then the country's premier labor law scholar, commented
caustically:
Business groups showed no genuine interest in reform.
Spokesmen for such groups ... beat the drums in an effort
to swell the public outcry against the abuses revealed at the
[Senate] hearings in order to obtain support for laws which
would strengthen the bargaining power of management in
relation to labor organizations.8
Ultimately the conservatives triumphed, and the product was
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin)
Act of 1959, 9 the first broadly inclusive federal statute dealing with
the internal framework and procedures of labor unions. Yet irony
has been piled upon irony. Not only is this wellspring of union
members' rights the construct in considerable part of employer lob-
byists bent on weakening labor organizations; in the two decades
since being enacted, Landrum-Griffin's internal controls have done
much to advance the cause of participatory democracy within un-
ions while doing little if any damage to the structure of the labor
movement. And perceptive management representatives have lived
to rue the day they helped empower feisty rank-and-iflers to speak
up and reject the "responsible" collective bargaining settlements ne-
gotiated by their unions' leadership.
Before a more detailed, if necessarily abbreviated, survey is un-
dertaken of the law governing labor organizations in the United
States, several points need to be underscored. First, despite its
sweep, the Landrum-Griffin Act is not the whole story concerning
the regulation of internal union affairs. Unlike the National Labor
Relations Act, which generally "preempts" or displaces state law
dealing with the relations between unions and private employers in-
volved in interstate commerce, Landrum-Griffin expressly provides
that, except in certain instances, state rules and remedies remain
applicable to union relationships with members. Thus, a state may
treat a union constitution as a contract between the organization
and a member, and grant the member relief parallel to or even
greater than that available under the federal statute. Second, Lan-
drum-Griffin is not the sole source of a member's rights under fed-
eral law against his union. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196410 protects a worker against discrimination in either em-
ployment or union status because of race, sex, religion, or national
origin. Finally, American labor law is remarkably parochial. It has
been almost unaffected by international agencies, treaties, or resolu-
tions, or by legal developments abroad. For good or ill, it is a dis-
tinctive system that tends to mirror the classless, individualistic,
8. Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act,
44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 258 (1959).
9. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1976).
10. 78 Stat 241, 253 (1964), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
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combative, and decentralized employment environment from which
it springs.1
I. UNIONS' LEGAL STATUS AND MEMBERSHIP POLICIES
A. General
Under the common law applicable in most states, labor unions
are classified as voluntary, unincorporated associations like fraterni-
ties or social clubs. Except for the rare organization that becomes
incorporated, there are no formal prerequisites for formation or dis-
solution. Furthermore, under the traditional view, unincorporated
labor unions have no separate legal identity apart from their mem-
bers, and therefore may neither sue nor be sued in their common
names. All this was changed for purposes of federal law by the La-
bor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act in 1947,12 which au-
thorized suits by and against unions on labor contracts and thereby
confirmed the federal concept of a labor organization as a juridical
entity. State law remains controlling, however, with regard to a
union's holding of property, its execution of ordinary commercial
contracts, and even many of its relationships with members under
its own constitution and bylaws.
B. Right of Admission
There is no general common law or statutory right to gain ad-
mission to a labor organization, even one that has been federally
certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the em-
ployees in a particular plant or shop. Indeed, the Taft-Hartley Act
explicitly preserved the power of unions to prescribe their own rules
concerning the acquisition or retention of membership. Federal civil
rights legislation, however, now forbids a labor organization to ex-
clude or expel a person from membership on such specific grounds
as race, sex, religion, national origin, or age.' 3
C. Compulsory Unionism
In order to control access to jobs and maximize membership,
unions in the past sought "closed shop" arrangements with employ-
ers. These agreements required employees to join a union and pay
dues and fees to it before they could get a job. In 1947 the Taft-Hart-
ley Act outlawed the closed shop but permitted the "union shop,"
which requires union membership only after a certain grace period,
ordinarily 30 days from the beginning of employment.
Despite the usual '"preemption" principle with respect to federal
law governing union-management relations, section 14(b) of Taft-
11. See Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law, 84
HARv. L. REV. 1394, 1458-62 (1971).
12. 61 Stat. 136, 156 & § 301 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
13. See note 10, supra; Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 81 Stat. 602
(1967), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. 11 1979).
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Hartley expressly authorizes the states to prohibit union security
arrangements allowable under the federal statute. Twenty states,
mostly in the South and West, have adopted such so-called "right-to-
work" laws. Organized labor has tried repeatedly, without success,
to secure the repeal of 14(b). The federal Railway Labor Act takes
the opposite course, and overrides state right-to-work laws in the
railroad and airline industries.
In 1947 section 14(b) may have been a legislative compromise
that was necessary to establish, as a matter of federal law, that a
union was entitled to seek agreements preventing "free riders"-
persons who reap the benefits of collective bargaining without pay-
ing their fair share of the costs. It is difficult, however, to discern a
principled basis for retaining 14(b). A national union negotiating a
national contract should not, even theoretically, have to impose the
total financial burden on those employees who do not reside in a
right-to-work state. "Open shops," where some employees support
the union and others do not, inevitably sow dissension and bitter-
ness among the workers. And there are no longer any grounds for
the "moral" argument that a person should not be compelled to be-
come a member of any organization as a condition of employment,
or be forced to contribute to political causes in which he does not
believe. The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that under a union
security arTangement an employee need not actually assume the
status or obligations of union membership. The only enforceable
duty is the payment of dues and fees, and even there all that can be
demanded is the pro rata cost of collective bargaining, not the ex-
penses of the union's political or social activities. 14
II. MEMBERS' CIVIL LIBERTIES
To the extent a union's constitution and bylaws spell out the
substantive and procedural rights of members within their organiza..
tion, those rights are generally enforceable in state courts as a mat..
ter of common law contract. With the adoption of the federal
Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, however, a substantially different con-
cept was introduced as the basis of members' institutional protec-
tions. After an impassioned plea on the floor of the Senate by
Senator McClellan, chairman of the special committee that investi-
gated labor corruption in the late '50s, the Senate accepted without
prior committee endorsement an amendment explicitly providing a
"Bill of Rights" for union members. In what is now Title I of Lan-
drum-Griffin, the emphasis is not upon members' contract or prop.-
erty rights, but upon the analogy to the rights of citizens in a
political democracy, protected by constitutional guarantees. The un.-
derlying philosophy was that labor organizations are of such great
public importance that federal legislation is essential to ensure
union members the exercise of basic liberties in the democratic pro-
14. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); NLRB v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
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cess-a far cry indeed from the notion that a labor organization is a
private voluntary association like a social club.
The "Bill of Rights" has one section guaranteeing union mem-
bers generally an "equal right" to nominate candidates, vote in
union elections, attend membership meetings, and participate in de-
liberations on union business. Title I then goes on to delineate cer-
tain more specific rights to free speech, procedural due process, and
the like. Unlike many other provisions of Landrum-Griffin, which
are subject to suits by the Secretary of Labor or to criminal sanc-
tions, Title I is largely enforceable by a private civil action brought
by the aggrieved member in federal district court. That distinction
could be rationalized on the ground the "Bill of Rights" deals with
peculiarly personal protections while the titles covering such items
as reports, elections, and "trusteeships" are more concerned with in-
stitutional safeguards. It is likely, however, that more pragmatic fac-
tors account for the difference in the enforcement mechanisms.
Some legislators wanted the Secretary of Labor to serve as a "sieve"
to protect unions against frivolous charges, while others wanted to
ensure direct access by individuals to the courts. Still others were
undoubtedly influenced by their view of whether or not it was desir-
able to provide free government legal assistance to members pursu-
ing claims against their union.
A. Free Speech and Assembly
Title I of Landrum-Griffin guarantees union members the right
to "meet and assemble freely" and to "express any views," subject
to the usual parliamentary rules governing the conduct of union
meetings. In a decision bitterly protested by union spokesmen, but
almost surely in line with the congressional design, a federal court
of appeals held that the "free speech" section prevented a union
from disciplining a member who libeled a local officer by wrongly
accusing him of theft.15 The officer's recourse was to the civil courts.
Landrum-Griffin's free speech protections are subject to a pro-
viso enabling a union to enforce a member's "responsibility... to-
ward the organization as an institution" and his duty not to
interefere with the union's "performance of its legal or contractual
obligations." That presumably covers such activities as advocacy of
a union "schism" or secessionist movement or of a "wildcat" or ille-
gal strike. The courts have been wary, however, about allowing la-
bor organizations much latitude under the proviso. For example, a
union could not expel a member for publicly urging the nonpayment
of union assessments, which the member mistakenly but reasonably
believed were imposed in violation of law.16
15. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
16. Farowitz v. Musicians Local 802, 303 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964).
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B. Right to Sue
An ancient tradition in the American labor movement holds that
intraunion quarrels should be settled "within the family." Thus,
most union constitutions forbade members from suing the organiza-
tion until they had first exhausted all available internal remedies.
In some cases that might take several years, which was plainly un-
reasonable. Landrum-Griffin prohibited union limits on a member's
right to sue or fie administrative charges, with the proviso that a
member "may be required to exhaust reasonable [intraunion] hear-
ing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time)"
before going against his organization.
It is a measure of the judiciary's solicitude for preserving mem-
bership rights against union impairment that the courts have read
the right-to-sue section as forbidding any union limitation whatso-
ever on members' suits or administrative charges. Probably in defi-
ance of Legislative intent, the exhaustion proviso has been
interpreted as merely authorizing the courts to require a member to
exhaust intraunion remedies but not as authorizing any such union
constitutional requirement.17 Union discipline of a member for filing
suit without first pursuing internal relief for even four months
would accordingly be a violation of the statute.
C. Procedural Due Process
In a provision that essentially parallels the common law of a
number of states, Title I of Landrum-Griffin requires that before a
union member may be disciplined (except for a dues default), he
must be served with written specific charges, given a reasonable
time to prepare his defense, and afforded a full and fair hearing.
The guarantee of a "full and fair hearing" includes the right to con-
front and cross-examine opposing witnesses and the right to trial
before an unbiased tribunal. But bias must be established through
a showing of improper motives, that is, specific prejudice. It is not
enough that a union, like many an administrative agency, combines
the prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions, for example, by having
the organization's president ifie the charges and then participate in
the trial body.18 Ordinarily an accused in a union proceeding is not
entitled to be represented by legal counsel.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Landrum-Griffin's proce-
dural safeguards do not authorize a court to determine the scope of
substantive offenses for which a union may discipline its mem-
bers.1 9 Furthermore, a federal court may only inquire whether there
was "some evidence" to support a union's finding of guilt and may
17. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961); NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418
(1968).
18. Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 911-13 (4th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
19. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971).
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not undertake a full-scale review of the record and an assessment of
the witnesses' credibility. On both these points it is possible that
state courts will apply stricter standards. The U.S. Supreme Court
was evidently affected by its reading of the "congressional intent to
allow unions to govern their own affairs."
D. Union Discipline Under the NLRA
The National Labor Relations Act, as originally enacted as the
Wagner Act and as subsequently amended by the Taft-Hartley Act,
contains no general regulation of internal union affairs and touches
upon them only tangentially in its restrictions on union security.
The theory was that the NLRA only protected workers in their sta-
tus as employees and not in their status as union members. Eventu-
ally, however, certain exceptions crept in. It became recognized as
forbidden "restraint or coercion" under the NLRA for a union to pe-
nalize a member in a way that is directly inconsistent with declared
congressional labor policy. An example would be fining or expelling
a member for filing unfair labor practice charges with the National
Labor Relations Board, the federal agency that administers the
NLRA. 20 In such instances it is immaterial that the discipline is
purely internal and does not affect the member's job in any way.
On the other hand, outside this uniquely sensitive area of
agency access, the NLRA leaves unions a free hand in most internal
matters, including member discipline. A union may fine or expel
members for working during a strike called against their employer,
or for receiving pay for production exceeding a set ceiling, and the
union may seek to enforce the fines in such cases through legal ac-
tion.2 1 Moreover, the NLRB is not authorized to test union fines for
the reasonableness of their amount; this is a question for the states
to resolve under contract principles. 22
There is one important qualification to the hands-off rule regard-
ing NLRA regulation of internal union discipline. If an employee
never joins a union (and even under a union security agreement, as
we have indicated, he need not assume formal membership), or if
he resigns in a timely fashion, he is free of all membership obliga-
tions except possibly dues payments. A union would then commit
an unfair labor practice if it attempted to fine such a nonmember for
strikebreaking or similar activity. 23
At this point even an American labor specialist may find his
head awhirl over all these distinctions. But there is a thread
through the thicket. Rigorous logic would confine NLRA coverage to
union conduct adversely affecting a person in his employment sta-
20. NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
21. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967); Scofleld v. NLRB, 394
U.S. 423 (1969).
22. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
23. NLRB v. Textile Workers Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 2113 (1972); Ma-
chinists Booster Lodge 405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
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tus, for example, getting the employer to discharge him. Yet the
logic crumbles, and courts permit the Labor Board to intervene, if
union activity impinges too far on core public policies, such as guar-
anteeing untrammeled employee access to federal agencies or pro-
tecting nonmembers against internal union sanctions.
III. UNION ADMINISTRATION
In reporting out the bill that became the Landrum-Griffin Act,
the Senate Labor Committee declared in 1959: "In providing reme-
dies for existing evils the Senate should be careful neither to under-
mine self-government within the labor movement nor to weaken
unions in their role as the bargaining representative of employ-
ees. '24 In keeping with this philosophy, as mentioned earlier, the in-
itial approach was to deal primarily with three defined trouble spots,
reporting and disclosure, elections, and trusteeships or parent-local
relations. Although Landrum-Griffin was much enlarged before final
passage, these provisions remain central features of the Act.
A. Reporting and Disclosure
About twenty states require labor unions to register or file orga-
nizational and financial reports. In addition, the tremendous growth
of welfare and pension funds during and after World War II, coupled
with legislative investigations revealing loose practices in their ad-
ministration, led several states to enact laws setting standards for
such funds and requiring reporting and disclosure.
Today the most important regulatory and reporting measures in
these areas are two federal laws, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 197425 and of course the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959. The former pro-
vides elaborate safeguards for all employee benefit plans
maintained by employers and unions in interstate commerce. Pen-
sions, for example, must meet minimum vesting, benefit accrual,
and funding requirements. Stiff fiduciary obligations are imposed
on all plan trustees and administrators. Enforcement is through
civil suit, by a plan participant or beneficiary or by the Secretary of
Labor. Criminal sanctions apply to willful violations.
Title II of the Landrum-Griifin Act prescribes five different types
of reports: (1) union organizational reports; (2) union financial re-
ports; (3) "conflict of interest" reports by union officers and employ-
ers; (4) employer reports on such matters as payments to union
representatives and payments to influence employees in the exer-
cise of their collective rights; and (5) reports by labor relations con-
sultants on their "persuader" or "informant" activities concerning
employees. Information contained in union organizational and
financial reports must be made available to the members of the
24. S. Rep. No. 187 on S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959).
25. 88 Stat. 829 (1974), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1976).
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union. The reporting obligations are subject to criminal sanctions
and to a civil suit by the Secretary of Labor for an injunction or
other appropriate remedy.
The practical results of all this paper work and regulatory zeal
probably have to be described as mixed. Shoddy pension plans
have been driven out and marginal ones spruced up. At the same
time, mountains of reports gather dust in government warehouses,
effectively concealed from public view by inadequate indices. The
fullest exploitation of these new statutory tools demands unusually
vigilant and determined union members.
B. Trusteeships
The constitutions of most national unions provide that if there is
financial malpractice or a denial of democratic process in a constitu-
ent local, the parent may suspend the subordinate body's autonomy
and impose a "trusteeship," a form of superintending control. Prior
to Landrum-Griffin, a handful of nationals was found to have estab-
lished trusteeships for the purpose of "milking" local treasuries or
improperly controlling votes. Title III of the Act prescribes the con-
ditions under which trusteeships may be created, requires reporting
and disclosure, prohibits voting by the trusteed union's delegates
unless they are democratically elected, and forbids the transfer of
the local's funds to the supervisory body. The Secretary of Labor
has reported flatly that Title III "has been effective in correcting the
malpractices disclosed" in trusteeships. 26
C. Election of Officers
Title IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act regulates the election of of-
ficers by local and national unions. There must be a secret ballot
vote of the membership or alternatively, in the case of a national
union, a vote at a convention of delegates who themselves have
been chosen by secret ballot. In secret ballot elections each mem-
ber "in good standing" is entitled to one vote. Elections at the na-
tional level must be held at least every five years and elections at
the local level at least every three years. Safeguards are also pro-
vided for nominating candidates, inspecting membership lists, dis-
tributing campaign literature, and having observers at the polls and
at the counting of the ballots.
The most litigated section of Title IV provides that all members
in good standing are eligible to be candidates for union office, sub-
ject only to "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed." Many
unions prescribe attendance requirements-for example, that a can-
didate for local office must have attended at least one-half of the reg-
ular meetings of the local during the three years preceding the
26. SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNION TRUSTEESHIPS: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS UPON
THE OPERATION OF TITLE III OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
ACT 11 (1962).
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election. Is such a qualification designed to ensure that candidates
will be active and well-versed in a union's affairs, or is it designed to
deter dissidents and benefit incumbents? The Secretary of Labor,
apparently supported at least in principle by the U.S. Supreme
Court, seems to apply a pragmatic test to these eligibility questions.
If a particular rule disqualifies all but a small percentage of the
union's rembership (perhaps more than two-thirds), it will be pre-
sumed invalid.27
After an election has been conducted, the Secretary of Labor
has exclusive authority to challenge it in a federal court action. But
prior to an election, Title IV expressly recognizes existing state
rights and remedies under a union's own constitution and bylaws.
Suits by the Secretary of Labor, the U.S. Supreme Court has held,
are generally limited to grounds about which an aggrieved member
has previously complained to the union.28 This requirement of prior
exhaustion of intraunion remedies is "designed to harmonize the
need to eliminate election abuses with a desire to avoid unnecessary
governmental intervention."
The major deficiency of Title IV is that, in states not having ade-
quate preelection safeguards of their own, it does not fully protect
candidates or would-be candidates when they need protection the
most, that is, just before an election. It is then that any disputes
over a candidate's qualifications or campaign tactics are most appro-
priately resolved. The proponents of Title IV's oddly bifurcated en-
forcement procedures undoubtedly had the best interests of
organized labor at heart. They wanted to minimize the likelihood of
delayed elections and the consequent disruption of a union's admin-
istration. Nonetheless, in the more progressive states at least, that
likelihood is already present, along with the possibility of substan-
tive decisions in conflict with federal policy. A more unified and
consistent federal enforcement procedure would probably better
serve the interests of both the candidates and their organization.
D. Officers' Fiduciary Duties
Landrum-Griffin's Title V makes union officials fiduciaries in re-
lation to their organization and its membership. They have an obli-
gation, enforceable by any member's civil suit for damages and an
accounting, to hold the union's "money and property solely for the
benefit of the organization and its members."
The fiduciary provision is a protean enactment, capable of being
infused with almost any meaning a court decides upon. One federal
circuit has taken the narrower view, emphasizing the specific refer-
ence to "money and property," and insisting this "is not a catch-all
provision under which union officials can be sued on any ground of
misconduct with which the plaintiffs choose to charge them."29 But
27. See, e.g., Steelworkers Local 3489 v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
28. Hodgson v. Steelworkers Local 6799, 403 U.S. 333 (1971).
29. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1964).
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other circuits have held that the fiduciary standard is applicable to
all exercises of an official's constitutional power and is not confined
to the handling of money and property.30
The more restricted reading of the fiduciary section is probably
closer to the original congressional intention. It may also comport
better with the goal of ensuring a continuation of effective union
leadership, and of not frightening off aspiring young men and wo-
men who might be unwilling to subject themselves to personal
financial liability for mere errors in administrative judgment. Yet
the fiduciary provision will remain a tantalizing temptation to any
federal court confronted with an egregious example of official mis-
conduct and unable to find another handy statutory hook on which
to hand a judicial remedy.
IV. UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
A paper of this short length necessarily becomes an exercise in
precis writing when it attempts any description of the complex fed-
eral law regulating labor and management's relationships in the
United States. Nonetheless, our commission calls for some discus-
sion of the rules governing a union's organizational and collective
bargaining activities, and so a few terse headnotes may be in order.
Apart from the railroad and airline industries, which are cov-
ered by the federal Railway Labor Act, union-employer dealings in
most other industries affecting interstate commerce are controlled
by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). This was originally
adopted as the Wagner Act in 1935 and subsequently amended by
the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act in 1947 and the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin)
Act in 1959. The NLRA does not apply to certain types of employ-
ees, such as agricultural workers, domestic servants, and supervi-
sors. In addition, state and municipal employees are covered by
state law and federal employees are covered by the separate Fed-
eral Service Labor Management and Employee Relations Law.31
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) guaran-
tees employees "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing and to engage in other concerted activities for
... mutual aid or protection." Employees are also entitled "to re-
frain from any or all such activities." The Act differs the most from
the labor laws of other industrial nations in the elaborate (perhaps
overly elaborate) rules and mechanisms that have been established
to implement these employees rights and certain other specified in-
terests of employers and the general public.
30. Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963); Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457
F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1972).
31. 92 Stat. 1191 (1978), 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (Supp. 11 1979).
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A. Organization and Representation of Employees
Under the NLRA it is an "unfair labor practice" for either em-
ployers or unions to coerce employees physically or discriminate
against them on the job because they do or do not wish to join a
union, engage in a peaceful strike or work stoppage, or exercise
other organizational rights. Although an employer is forbidden to
discharge peaceful strikers, it may replace them permanently in or-
der to carry on its business.
The Act creates the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to
administer the unfair labor practice provisions of the statute and to
resolve disputes concerning the representation of employees. The
Board's decisions are not self-enforcing, however, and are subject to
review by the federal courts of appeals and in special cases by the
U.S. Supreme Court.
The NLRB conducts secret ballot elections to determine
whether a majority of the employees in a particular plant or shop
desire to be represented by a union. During the election campaign,
both employer and union may freely express their views about
unionization to the employees, but neither may resort to threats or
bribes. 'Empirical studies have suggested that the Labor Board
overestimates the importance of employee fear, supposedly engen-
dered by the parties' speeches and other communications, as a fac-
tor in the outcome of elections. 32
If the union wins the election, the NLRB will certify it as the ex-
clusive bargaining representative of all the employees in the unit,
both supporters and nonsupporters. Employment terms negotiated
by the union will supersede any individual contracts of hire.33 This
union power of "exclusive representation" is of course one of the
most distinctive characteristics of the American industrial system.
It is an awesome power, which the U.S. Supreme Court has found
necessary to counterbalance by imposing on majority unions a cor-
relative "duty of fair representation." The latter obligates the union
to represent all unit employees, dissenters and adherents alike,
"honestly and in good faith and without invidious discrimination or
arbitrary conduct. '34
A union is generally entitled to "picket," or patrol with signs
reading, "Nonunion," "Unfair," or the like, for up to 30 days at the
place of business of an employer it is trying to organize. To picket
longer for organizing purposes, the union must file for a NLRB elec-
tion. If the union then loses the election, it is forbidden to resume
its organizational picketing for a year. These seemingly arbitrary
rules are an example of a congressional effort to balance a union's
interest in the opportunity to persuade and pressure a nonunion
32. E.g., J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELEC-
TIONS: LAw AND REALITY 144-150 (1976).
33. J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
34. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 191 (1967). See also Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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employer and its employees against their interest in being free of
such disruptive activity when a majority of the workers do not want
union representation.
A favorite economic weapon of American unions, much less em-
ployed in Europe, is the so-called "secondary boycott." For exam-
ple, if a union has an immediate or primary dispute with Ace
Manufacturer, it may try to bring pressure to bear on Ace by asking
the employees of Black Retailer, a neutral or "secondary" party, to
strike Black to force Black to cease handling Ace products. The
Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments to the NLRA drasti-
cally restricted the use of the secondary boycott. Although Con-
gress apparently acted out of a sense of moral outrage over the
plight of the hapless neutral in these situations, there is evidence
the actual extent of employer injury and union need in boycott
cases differs markedly from industry to industry, and called for a
much more discriminating legislative judgment than a sweeping
prohibition.35
B. Collective Bargaining
An employer and a union representing its employees have a
mutual obligation under the NLRA to bargain with each other in
"good faith" over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." The prescribed mandatory subjects include compen-
sation in almost every conceivable form as well as working condi-
tions in the plant or shop, but not "managerial prerogatives" or
internal union matters. The parties have a duty to make reasonable
efforts to accommodate differences and reach common ground, but
ultimately they have no obligation to enter a contract. That is in
keeping with the fundamental plank of federal labor policy that un-
ions and management should resolve their own disputes through
voluntary collective bargaining and not through the government's
imposition of a solution. Even so, apparently no other Western
country attempts to enforce anything like the "good faith" standard
and to define so meticulously the subjects about which the parties
must, or need not, negotiate.
As a matter of practice rather than law, most collective bargain-
ing agreements in the United States differ significantly from their
counterparts elsewhere in that they set the exact terms of employ-
ment for a particular plant or company, instead of installing a "floor"
for a whole industry.
If a labor dispute becomes serious enough to "imperil the na-
tional health or safety," the Taft-Hartley Act authorizes the Presi-
dent to initiate proceedings to secure an 80-day federal injunction
against any strike or lockout. This procedure was followed about
three dozen times in the years after 1947 but it has now fallen into
35. See, e.g., St. Antoine, The Rational Regulation of Union Restrictive Practices,
in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1968: PROCEEDINGS
OF FOURTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW 1, 10-14, 17-19 (1968).
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disuse. The reality may be that in today's world a genuine national
emergency dispute is more a political than a legal problem.
C. Contract Enforcement
About 95 percent of the major American labor contracts provide
for a grievance procedure capped by arbitration. In the grievance
process the union and the employer seek a voluntary settlement of
any dispute over the meaning or application of the agreement. If
the parties fail they may invoke arbitration, which is typically a re-
ferral of the issue to an impartial third party for a final and binding
determination.
Nearly all union-employer contract disputes are resolved during
the grievance process. The vast majority of the rest are handled
routinely through arbitration. In the relatively rare instances when
a party resists arbitration or refuses to comply with an arbitration
award, section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act authorizes an enforce-
ment suit in federal district court. According to the U.S. Supreme
Court, arbitration is a preferred method of dispute settlement, and
doubts are to be resolved in favor of enforcing an arbitration agree-
ment or award.36 The policy of promoting arbitration is so pro-
nounced that if a union strikes over an arbitrable grievance, an
employer may have the strike enjoined under section 301, despite
the usual Norris-La Guardia Act prohibition of strike injunctions by
the federal courts.3 7
V. CONCLUSION
Proportionately, the numerical strength of organized labor in
the United States has never amounted to more than half of that in
most countries of Western Europe. Today, American union mem-
bership has dipped below 20 percent of the total labor force.38 The
continuing shift from the blue-collar to the white-collar sectors of
employment is probably the principal cause of the recent decline.
Yet more pervasive reasons must be sought for the traditional reluc-
tance of many American workers to organize. The very character of
American society and the environment of the work place-the lack
of fixed class lines; the individualism, enterprising spirit, resistance
to organizational discipline, and even combativeness of both em-
ployers and employees; and the multiplicity and decentralization of
institutions in a sprawling subcontinent-are all part of the
explanation.
It is also entirely possible that our federal laws regulating labor-
36. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
37. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
38. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1980, § 3, p. 1, col. 1. See generally U.S. BuR. LAB. STAT.,
DEP'T LAB. BuLL. No. 2000, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1978 at 507 (1979); L.
REYNOLDS, LABOR EcoNoMics AND LABOR RELATIONS 352-58 (7th ed. 1978).
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management relations have tipped the balance of power in the use
of organizing and bargaining weapons too far against the unions.
Thus it may not be wholly coincidental that the relative growth of
organized labor in the private sector came to a halt almost simulta-
neously with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Nonethe-
less, it has become practically an article of faith for most American
labor scholars that at least the laws covering internal union affairs
and guaranteeing individual membership rights have served a noble
purpose. As one of the wisest contemporary observers of the labor
scene has commented: "None except a democratic union ... can
achieve the idealistic aspirations which justify labor
organizations. '39
39. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58
MICH. L. REV. 819, 830 (1960).
